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 May the farce be with you: confusing 
sculptures post-Lucasfilm 
Elinor Coombs 
 
Abstract 
This paper examines the copyright law relating to sculptures, 
particularly focusing on the UK’s decision in Lucasfilm v 
Ainsworth, which concerns Stormtrooper helmets from the Star 
Wars franchise, and whether they constituted sculptures under the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. The UK Supreme Court 
ruled the helmets not to be sculptures because of their utilitarian 
purpose as props in a film, meaning the helmets were unprotected 
by copyright law. This was a high-profile case for intellectual 
property law, but it unfortunately failed to clarify the already 
confused area. This paper discusses the statute and case law 
surrounding sculptures, and to what extent the UK courts 
successfully applied the law. It is concluded that whilst a great 
attempt was made to untangle the previously inconsistent case law, 
the Lucasfilm decision failed to do so. 
 
1! Introduction 
 Lucasfilm v Ainsworth 1  is an exceptionally significant intellectual 
property (IP) case, not only because of UK precedent and the impact it 
will have on future copyright cases, 2  but also because it had an 
opportunity to clarify a substantially confused area of law. There were 
two core matters at issue in Lucasfilm, the first being whether the UK 
 
1 [2011] UKSC 39. 
2 Henry Lydiate, ‘What is Art: A Brief Review of International Judicial 
Interpretations?of Art in the Light of the UK Supreme Court’s 2011 Judgment in the 
Star Wars Case: Lucasfilm Limited v. Ainsworth’ (2012) 4 Journal of International 
Media and Entertainment Law 111, 135. 
37  Volume I – Spring 2020 
had jurisdictional claim to hear the case, considering its origin was the 
US. However, substantial work has been undertaken in this area, and 
this paper shall therefore make no further comment on this. Instead, it 
analyses the second issue – the ruling and judgments of the case, and 
its consequences for the law of copyright concerning sculptures. The 
first part of the paper addresses the relevant statute concerning 
copyright law, before chronologically examining the history of cases 
related to sculptures specifically. The second part then discusses the 
facts of Lucasfilm, with an analysis of its judgment, before concluding 
that Lucasfilm had an ideal opportunity to clarify an already confused 
area of law, but failed to do so comprehensively.  
2! Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 
The main question arising from Lucasfilm was whether the 
Stormtrooper helmets from the Star Wars franchise constituted 
sculptures. Sculptures are a sub-category of copyright-protectable 
work, and it is therefore necessary to examine the law of copyright in 
the UK, which currently subsists in the Copyright, Designs and Patents 
Act 1988 (CDPA). Section 1 outlines the different types of protectable 
work, with Section 1(a) including artistic works. Section 4 defines what 
constitutes an artistic work, with (1)(a) including sculptures. Section 
2(b) vaguely defines a sculpture in the inclusive sense – it ‘includes a 
cast or model made for purposes of sculpture’ – but the definition does 
not extend beyond this. What is equally important to note is that section 
4(1)(a) states these works obtain protection ‘irrespective of artistic 
quality’, which was originally brought into copyright law by the 
Copyright Act 1956.3 In other words, a judgment cannot be passed on 
the artistic quality of the piece in question, for that is an irrelevant factor 
in the enquiry of whether it constitutes copyright-protectable art.  
 
Sections 51 and 52 are also essential when discussing copyright 
protection.4 Section 51 provides a defence for copyright infringement 
 
3 Copyright Act 1956, s 3(1)(a).  
4 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, ss 51, 55.  
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if the end result of a design document was not an artistic work. Section 
51(3) defines a design document as ‘any record of a design, whether in 
the form of a drawing, a written description, a photograph, data stored 
in a computer or otherwise.’ The reference to a design document in this 
provision simply indicates the document containing the original 
industrial design of an article, and is included within the Act to ensure 
that a drawing is not subject to both copyright protection and design 
right protection. In Lucasfilm, the design document would therefore 
refer to the original documents containing the drawings of the 
Stormtrooper helmets. Section 52 reduces the length of copyright 
protection to a mere 25 years if items of the copyright-protectable 
material were mass produced and available for the public to purchase. 
These sections will be integral to the analysis of Lucasfilm later in the 
paper.  
3! Case law 
Identifying artistic works of literature, music or dance under the CDPA 
is relatively unproblematic, but recognising sculptures is far more 
troublesome.5 There have been numerous cases concerning copyright 
protection of sculptures, and it is rather challenging to detect a 
consistent logical trend in the judgments. This being said, there seems 
to be an increasing number of rulings indicating that the visual appeal, 
or the artistic significance of the item in question, holds weight in 
whether an item is deemed a sculpture, subsequently raising the bar for 
obtaining copyright protection, contrary to the CDPA.6  
 
One of the earliest decisions regarding the definition of a sculpture rests 
with Britain v Hanks, which concerned hand-painted toy soldiers.7 
They were held to be artistic objects, and were thus protected under the 
Sculpture Copyright Act 1814. This seems a sensible and rational 
 
5 Lydiate (n 2) 111. 
6 David Langwallner, ‘Copyright Protection for Works of Sculpture and Artistic 
Craftsmanship: Recent Developments in Australia and the United Kingdom’ (2009) 3 
Irish Business Law Quarterly 13, 13.  
7 [1902] 86 LT 765.  
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decision, with no clouding of the term ‘sculpture’. 8  However, in 
subsequent cases, this logical position was increasingly obscured and 
the case law repeatedly unsettled. 
 
The Court of Appeal in New Zealand ruled in Wham-O 9  that the 
wooden models used to make the moulds of Frisbees constituted 
sculptures under the Copyright Act 1962, which is exceedingly similar 
to the CDPA. An interesting distinction was made between the Frisbee 
discs themselves and the moulds that produced them. The Court of 
Appeal rightly decided that it would stretch the definition of sculpture 
too far to rule the Frisbees themselves as sculptures, but this was made 
on the basis that they were manufactured by an injection moulding 
process.10 This has been deemed an odd distinction to make, because 
the Court ruled against Frisbees constituting sculptures purely based on 
the manufacturing process, which is not a statutory requirement in need 
of consideration.11 Additionally, in spite of the Court of Appeal not 
wanting to stretch the definition too far beyond its original meaning, it 
still ruled that moulds for the Frisbees constituted sculptures, even 
though moulds designed for industrial purposes would not traditionally 
be viewed as artistic sculptures considering the ordinary use of the term. 
Therefore, the Court of Appeal may still have inadvertently widened 
the definition of a sculpture in spite of their intentions not to do so. This 
ruling clearly displays, however, the Court’s lack of judgment on the 
artistic quality of the objects in question, which aligns with the required 
statutory criteria.  
 
After the decision in Wham-O, J & S Davis attempted to rationalise 
domestic copyright law by ruling that dental impression trays cannot 
constitute a sculpture.12 Initially, this decision appears logical: to ensure 
 
8 Langwallner (n 6). 
9 Wham-O Manufacturing v Lincoln Industries Ltd [1985] RPC 127 (NZ CoA). 
10 ibid. 
11 Anthony Misquitta, ‘What Is Art: Artistic Craftsmanship Revisited Lucasfilm Ltd. v 
Ainsworth’ (2009) 14 Art Antiquity and Law 281, 282. 
12 J & S Davis (Holdings) Ltd v Wright Health Group Ltd [1988] RPC 403.  
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the definition of sculptures is not construed too broadly, it sensibly 
ruled that dental impression trays cannot constitute artistic works. The 
decision in J & S Davis subsequently appears more coherent than 
Wham-O’s decision to rule Frisbee moulds as sculptures, which 
broadened the definition. However, an issue arises from J & S Davis. 
The judgment is incompatible with the CDPA, because the main 
justification for the decision concerned the manufacturing process and 
the fact that the trays were temporary. These considerations are not a 
requirement of the Act.13 Thus, as with the Wham-O judgment, the 
judges were focusing on unnecessary factors in determining whether an 
object constitutes a copyright-protectable work. Therefore, even though 
J &S Davis ruled correctly in judging dental impression trays not to be 
sculptures, so that its definition remains rightly narrow, their 
justification was still flawed.  
 
Next came Breville, and its judgment resembles Wham-O more so than 
J & S Davis in its ruling that plaster shapes for sandwich-maker 
appliances constituted sculptures.14 The similarities between Breville 
and Wham-O arise from the decision to label items as sculptures, 
despite them falling outside of the common use of the term, thus 
broadening its definition, whereas J & S Davis attempted to narrow it. 
Plus, despite the intuitively outlandish nature of these decisions, these 
two cases were decided in accordance with the historical and doctrinal 
view that artistic quality is irrelevant in determining artistic work, as it 
is clear that the judges were not making a judgment on the artistic nature 
of these ‘sculptures’ in accordance with statutory requirements.15  
 
Just two years later, IP law was called to the stand again in Metix,16 in 
which Laddie J found that the moulds of cartridges used to mix 
chemicals did not constitute sculptures, contrasting the decisions of 
Wham-O and Breville, and following J & S Davis. It was ruled that, 
 
13 Misquitta (n 11) 283.! 
14 Breville Europe plc v Thorn EMI Domestic Appliances Ltd [1995] FSR 77. 
15 Langwallner (n 6) 13. 
16 Metix (UK) Ltd v GH Maughan (Plastics) Ltd [1997] FSR 718.  
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‘there is no reason why the word “sculpture” in the 1988 Act should be 
extended far beyond the meaning which that word has to ordinary 
members of the public,’17 and the term should therefore be construed 
narrowly. A similar approach was taken in Wildash v Klein,18 in which 
it was ruled that craftworks made of out of wire, glass rods, glass 
nuggets, copper foil and other materials did constitute sculptures. Angel 
J cited Laddie J in Metix, arguing once again that the term ‘sculpture’ 
should not be stretched too far past its original meaning.  
 
This diverse understanding of sculptures presented by recent case law 
still leaves the definitional issue unresolved. In Metix, Laddie J asserted 
the impossibility of specifically defining whether an item constitutes a 
sculpture.19 Although, he simultaneously found that a sculpture must be 
created by the hand of an artist, which significantly raises the standard 
for obtaining copyright protection. Such a narrowing of the meaning of 
a sculpture appears unjust when a comprehensive definition of a 
sculpture is not yet to be provided by the courts.  
4! Lucasfilm v Ainsworth 
Lucasfilm concerns the Stormtrooper helmets designed and produced 
for the first Star Wars film released in 1977, renamed as Star Wars 
Episode IV: A New Hope. George Lucas created the plotline and the 
characters, and Ralph McQuarrie designed two-dimensional versions of 
the costumes he envisaged for the Stormtroopers, including their 
armour and a helmet. Andrew Ainsworth then produced the three-
dimensional vacuum moulds for the helmets that were used in the films. 
The issue arose in 2004, when Ainsworth started reproducing the 
helmets using his original tools and selling them to the public. In doing 
so, he made at least US$8,000 but no more than US$30,000. Upon 
discovering Ainsworth’s business venture, Lucas sued him in the US 
District Court in California for breach of copyright of the helmets. The 
 
17 ibid 722.  
18 (2004) 61 IPR 324. 
19 Metix (n 16). 
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Court ruled in Lucas’s favour, granting him US$20 million in damages, 
but with Ainsworth’s lack of assets in the US, three claims were 
initiated in the UK – one to enforce the US ruling, one under US 
copyright law, and a final one for UK infringement of copyright.20  
 
The debate in the UK over whether the Stormtrooper helmets 
constituted sculptures was important in relation to sections 51 and 52 
of the CDPA. It was in Lucasfilm’s interest to prove that the helmets 
were artistic works, specifically sculptures, because then the helmets 
would be exempt from the section 51 defence. As mentioned 
previously, section 51 provides that copyright is not infringed if one 
copies a design document, unless the copied design documents lead to 
artistic works, such as sculptures. Therefore, if Lucasfilm successfully 
argued that the helmets constituted sculptures, Ainsworth would have 
been unable to access the section 51 defence, and thus would have been 
infringing Lucasfilm’s copyright by copying the original design 
documents of the helmets to recreate and sell them. Then, under section 
52, Lucasfilm would also wish to prove that the helmets constituted 
sculptures, because otherwise the mass production and selling of the 
Stormtrooper merchandise would have invalidated the entire period of 
protection of their copyright; it would only last 25 years as opposed to 
the whole life of the author plus 70 years, and would therefore have 
expired by the time the case was heard, meaning Ainsworth would not 
be in breach of any copyright. 21  It was therefore of paramount 
importance for Lucasfilm to prove that the helmets constituted 
sculptures.  
 
In the UK High Court, Mann J dismissed the enforceability of the US 
judgment, and also ruled the helmets were not sculptures under the 
CDPA because of their utilitarian purpose, and therefore no copyright 
protection applied. In his judgment, Mann J disagreed with the rulings 
 
20 Kristen Elisabeth Bollinger, ‘A New Hope for Copyright: The U.K. Supreme Court 
Ruling in Lucasfilm Ltd. v. Ainsworth and Why Congress Should Follow Suit’ (2012) 
20 Journal of Intellectual Property Law 87, 90.  
21 Copyright Act, s 12(3)(a). 
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in Wham-O and Breville, instead agreeing with Metix’s narrow reading 
of the CDPA, and therefore argued that the helmets were not sculptures 
based on the fact that, ‘[i]t would not accord with the normal use of 
language to apply the term “sculpture”’ to the items.22 However, the 
High Court did rule that the US copyright law claims were justiciable 
in the UK, and therefore Ainsworth was in breach of Lucas’s copyright 
when the relevant US copyright legislation was applied.23 The Court of 
Appeal subsequently agreed that the helmets could not be protected 
under UK copyright law, and similarly asserted that the rulings of 
Wham-O and Breville produced ‘a result which offends common sense 
and in our view is wrong’.24 The Court of Appeal also agreed with 
Mann J in that the US judgment was unenforceable, but overturned the 
decision that the US copyright claim could succeed, ruling that the 
enforcement of a foreign copyright claim was not within an English 
Court’s power. 25  The UK Supreme Court (UKSC) agreed with the 
Court of Appeal, and therefore Lucas lost to Ainsworth, and was left 
with no way to recover any damages.26  
5! Analysis of the judgments  
In Lucasfilm, the UK courts were faced yet again with the awkward 
question of ‘what is an artistic work?’ Or, more specifically, ‘what is a 
sculpture?’27 This raises a challenging point of law, as the CDPA is 
extremely clear that no judgment should be passed on the artistic quality 
of the pieces in question, so any judgment on the Stormtrooper helmets 
must be made on a purely objective level.  
 
 
22  Lucasfilm Ltd and Others (Appellants) v Ainsworth and Another (Respondents) 
[2011] UKSC 39. 
23 Bollinger (n 20).  
24 Lucasfilm Ltd and Others (Appellants) v Ainsworth and Another (Respondents) 
[2009] EWCA Civ 1328, [2010] Ch 503 [66]. 
25 Bollinger (n 20).  
26 ibid.  
27 Ron Moscona, ‘Stormtroopers Suffer Crushing Defeat in English Court: Star Wars 
Copyright Decision Serves as a Reminder to the Creative Industries’ (2010) 22(6) 
Intellectual Property &Technology Law Journal 19, 19.  
44 
 
 York Law Review 
Mann J described the Stormtrooper helmets as:  
 
one of the most abiding images in the film ... The purpose of the 
helmet was that it was to be worn as an item of costume in a film, to 
identify a character, but in addition to portray something about that 
character – its allegiance, force, menace, purpose and, to some 
extent, probably its anonymity. It was a mixture of costume and 
prop.28  
 
Mann J used this definition to establish that the helmets were utilitarian 
and functional only as props within the film, but his in-depth, 
descriptive summary implies the opposite – that the helmets were works 
of art that had a visual appeal and an effect on the audience, and 
therefore cannot be confined to functional use as props. It also reveals 
that, whether consciously or not, a judgment was being made upon their 
artistic quality. These descriptive statements should be irrelevant to the 
argument that they are not sculptures because they have a utilitarian 
purpose as costumes. Instead one is left feeling that, if Mann J is capable 
of offering such an artistic description of the helmets, surely they are 
sculptures.  
 
Mann J went on to list nine guidelines to consider when identifying 
whether an object constitutes a sculpture, as follows:29  
 
1.! the normal use of the word sculpture has to be considered; 
2.! the concept could extend beyond what would normally be 
understood as a sculpture in the sense of a work in an art 
gallery; 
3.! it would be inappropriate to stray too far from normal 
considerations of what is a sculpture; 
4.! no judgment may be made about artistic merits; 
5.! not every three-dimensional representation of a concept is a 
 
28 Lucasfilm Ltd and Others (Appellants) v Ainsworth and Another (Respondents) 
[2008] EWHC 1878 (Ch), [2009] FSR 103, [2] and [121]. 
29 ibid [118]. 
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sculpture; 
6.! a sculpture has visual appeal as part of its purpose; 
7.! an object having an additional use may also qualify as a 
sculpture but it must still have a visual appeal to qualify; 
8.! the purpose for which the object was created should be 
considered; and  
9.! the process of fabrication is relevant but not determinative.30! 
 
Some of these criteria seem very reasonable and reflect previous 
judgments handed down by Laddie J and Angel J, such as the first three 
requiring the use of the word ‘sculpture’ not to be stretched too far from 
its original meaning,31 and the fourth requiring that no judgment be 
made on the artistic quality of the piece.32  However, some criteria 
appear to overstep the judiciary’s legitimate role in applying IP law, 
delimiting its scope in a manner potentially incompatible with the 
CDPA. For example, criterion six requiring that a sculpture must have 
some visual appeal as part of its purpose necessitates an assessment of 
aesthetic quality of the item. This criterion is controversial because it 
could encourage a judgment upon artistic quality, which is strictly 
prohibited under the CDPA, and which is in direct contrast to Mann J’s 
fourth criterion.33 Thus, if a court were to deem an item as too visually 
unattractive, they would consequently be denying it the status of 
sculpture based on a judgment of its artistic quality, contrary to the 
statutory requirements. 
 
However, even if these requirements are not overstepping the mark and 
one believes Mann J is not suggesting a judgment on artistic quality, it 
seems the Stormtrooper helmets could meet these guidelines regardless. 
As Lucasfilm argued:  
 
in the present case, the question of functionality does not arise, 
 
30 ibid. 
31 Metix (n 16).  
32 Breville (n 14).  
33 CDPA, s 4(1)(a).  
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because the articles in question have no functional purpose 
whatever. The Stormtroopers’ helmets and armour did not exist in 
order to keep their wearers warm or decent or to protect them from 
injury in an inter-planetary war. Their sole purpose was to make a 
visual impression on the filmgoer. They are therefore artistic 
works.34  
 
Thus, the purpose of the helmets was artistic, as they were designed for 
the purpose of visual appeal. It therefore seems unjust for the UKSC to 
agree with Mann J in that the helmets cannot constitute sculptures based 
on the idea that, ‘[I]t was the Star Wars film that was the work of art 
that Lucas and his companies created. The helmet was utilitarian in the 
sense that it was an element in the process of production of the film.’35 
The UKSC admits that the film is clearly a work of art, but deem the 
helmets themselves as simply a process within the creation of the 
artistic film. This reverts back to cases such as Wham-O36 and J & S 
Davis37 which controversially argued for or against sculptures based on 
the manufacturing processes. The nature of this reasoning is 
dangerously close to the UKSC’s ruling, as it takes into account 
unnecessary factors which are risking overly ambitious judicial 
interpretation that is incompatible with the CDPA. 
 
Ultimately, copyright is primarily concerned with balancing the 
exclusive protection of the proprietor of the copyright, and allowing 
others to reproduce the works under fair dealing or another statutory 
defence outlined in the CDPA. Within that balance, both parties’ 
financial interests are held in tension.38 It therefore seems Lucasfilm 
 
34 Lucasfilm (n 22) [39].  
35 ibid [44]. 
36 Wham-O Manufacturing (n 9). 
37 J & S Davis (n 12). 
38 Tim Vollans, ‘Empire Strikes Back: Lessons from the Supreme Court’s Judgment 
in Lucasfilm Limited and Others (Appellants) v. Ainsworth and Another 
(Respondents) [2011] UKSC 39, July 2011’ (2012) 7 International Journal of Law and 
Information Technology 276, 277. 
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was less concerned about the issue of art, and much more about the 
issue of finances, given Lucas wanted to claim his US$20 million in 
damages for Ainsworth’s profit making of up to US$30,000.39 
 
Considering the parties’ drastically unequal financial situations, it is 
entirely possible that upon the case reaching the UK, Mann J in the High 
Court, the Court of Appeal, and the UKSC all recognised the economic 
weight of the proceedings and deemed it an extremely harsh judgment 
for Ainsworth to have been found guilty of infringing UK copyright 
law. One is therefore forced to ask: did the judges sympathise with 
Ainsworth, who would have owed substantial sums to the Lucasfilm 
corporation, so altered their interpretation of the statute to reach a just 
outcome in order to restrict the severe effects of a formalistic 
interpretation of the CDPA? This appears plausible, given a logical 
application of the CDPA would result in finding in favour of Lucasfilm. 
While a desire to protect an individual from substantial liability to a 
corporation would be understandable, this decision has come at the 
expense of a sensible application of legislation, compounding the 
confused and unsettled status of IP law in this area. 
6! Conclusion 
It seems clear that the ruling in Lucasfilm fails to clarify, and may 
further obscure, an already muddled area of IP law. Mann J was faced 
with a very difficult task of assessing all the previous case law 
concerning copyright and sculptures, which have been shown to be 
inconsistent and confusing, and his attempt to resolve the issues of IP 
law must be commended. Unfortunately, not only is the conclusion of 
the case logically suspect, with the Stormtrooper helmets ruled not to 
be sculptures, but the added element of considerable financial gains for 
Lucasfilm and an almost incomprehensible loss for Ainsworth creates 
an atmosphere of uncertainty surrounding the rationale of the decision. 
The UKSC has paved the way for future copyright claims, but it is 
unfortunate that Lucasfilm was unable to clearly provide the long-
 
39 Misquitta (n 11) 289.  
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awaited answer to the question of ‘what is a sculpture?’ It is inevitable 
that the issue will arise again, and one must simply hope that the next 
occasion results in a comprehensive and satisfactory ruling resolving 
this lengthy discussion of copyright law and sculptures, although the 
case law’s history indicates this is unlikely.  
 
